Abstract. In this paper we introduce a new method of attacks on block ciphers, the interpolation attack. This new method is useful for attacking ciphers using simple algebraic functions (in particular quadratic functions) as S-boxes. Also, ciphers of low non-linear order are vulnerable to attacks based on higher order di erentials. Recently, Knudsen and Nyberg presented a 6-round prototype cipher which is provably secure against ordinary di erential cryptanalysis. We show how to attack the cipher by using higher order di erentials and a variant of the cipher by the interpolation attack. It is possible to successfully cryptanalyse up to 32 rounds of the variant using about 2 32 chosen plaintexts with a running time less than 2 64 . Using higher order di erentials, a new design concept for block ciphers by Kiefer is also shown to be insecure. Rijmen et al presented a design strategy for block ciphers and the cipher SHARK. We show that there exist ciphers constructed according to this design strategy which can be broken faster than claimed. In particular, we cryptanalyse 5 rounds of a variant of SHARK, which deviates only slightly from the proposed SHARK.
Introduction
In an r-round iterated cipher the ciphertext is computed by iteratively applying in r rounds a round function G to the plaintext, s.t. The work in this paper was initiated while the authors were visiting the Isaac Newton Institute, Cambridge, U.K., February 1996. and the ciphertext is the concatenation of C R r and C L r . Note that F can be any function taking as arguments an n-bit text and a round key K i and producing n bits. '+' is a commutative group operation on the set of n bit blocks. For the remainder of this paper we will assume that '+' is the exclusive-or operation ( ).
Based on the use of a quadratic function over a Galois eld, Knudsen and Nyberg demonstrated in 10] how to construct a cipher which is provably secure against di erential cryptanalysis 1]. The cipher is a Feistel cipher with the function F given by F : GF (2 32 ) ! GF (2 32 ) with F(k; x) = d(f(e(x) k)); where f : GF (2 33 ) ! GF (2 33 ), f(x) = x 3 , k 2 GF (2 33 ), e : GF (2 32 ) ! GF (2 33 ) is a function which extends its argument by concatenation with an a ne combination of the input bits, and d : GF (2 33 ) ! GF (2 32 ) discards one bit from its argument. We call this cipher KN.
Also, we will consider the cipher with round function given by F k (x) = f(x k) where f : GF (2 32 ) ! GF (2 32 ), f(x) = x 3 , i.e., the cubing function's input is not extended and the output not truncated as in the previous case. We call this cipher PURE.
Both ciphers are secure against di erential attacks 10]. Also, both ciphers are secure against the linear attack 7], which follows from 9].
In 10] the cipher KN is de ned to be used with 6 rounds and since f(x) is di erentially 2-uniform, it is possible to prove that this yields a provably secure cipher (secure against conventional di erential cryptanalysis). The same holds for PURE. However, in both cases the non-linear order of the output is low with respect to the input and this can be exploited to mount an attack.
In the following, x = (x L ; x R ) denotes the plaintext where x L and x R denote the left and right hand side of x, respectively. Similarly, y = (y L ; y R ) denotes the ciphertext. By the reduced cipher, we denote the cipher that one gets by removing the nal round of the original cipher. The output from this cipher is denotedỹ = (ỹ L ;ỹ R ).
The attacks presented in this paper are classi ed according to the taxonomy of 4]. That is, by a key-recovery attack we mean that an attacker nds the secret key. By a global deduction we mean that an attacker nds an algorithm, which encrypts any plaintext into a valid ciphertext without knowing the secret key. By an instance deduction we mean that an attacker nds an algorithm, which encrypts a subset of all plaintexts into valid ciphertexts without knowing the secret key. In the key-recovery attacks we try to guess the last-round key. The guess is then used to decrypt the ciphertext by one round and in this way one (hopefully) obtains the output from the reduced cipher. If there exists a method to distinguish whether this is the actual output from the reduced cipher or not, then we can nd the last-round key. Once this key has been found, attacks similar to the ones we present can be mounted on a cipher one round shorter than the original. As the measurement of the time needed by an attack, we use the total number of encryptions of the attacked block cipher. This paper is organised as follows. In x 2 we give new attacks based on higher order di erentials. We apply the attacks to the cipher KN by Knudsen and Nyberg 10] and to a cipher by Kiefer 3] . In x 3 we present our new attack on block ciphers, the interpolation attack. We apply the attack to a cipher, provably secure against di erential and linear attacks. Also, we apply our methods to a slightly modi ed version of the cipher SHARK 11] . We conclude in x 4.
Attacks Using Higher Order Di erentials
In 6] Lai gave a de nition of higher order derivatives of discrete functions. Later Knudsen used higher order di erentials to cryptanalyse ciphers presumably secure against conventional di erential attacks, i.e. attacks based on rst order di erentials 5]. In this section we give an extension of Knudsen's attacks and apply it in an attack on the cipher KN. We refer to 6, 5] for the de nitions of higher order di erentials.
Consider a Feistel cipher with block size 2n. Suppose that x R is kept constant and consider the right hand sideỹ R of the output from the reduced cipher. Since x R is a constant, the bits inỹ R are all expressible as polynomials GF(2) x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :; x n ] in the bits of x L = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :; x n ). Assume that these polynomials have degree not higher than d. Then according to 6, Proposition 2] (see also 5]), we have
where L d denotes a d-dimensional subspace of GF (2) (b) For all a 2 GF(2) d+1 :
The key for which ends up being zero is the correct last-round key with a high probability. Consequently, for every possible value k of the last-round key, we check whether the corresponding value of is zero, and if it is, then we have found the correct key with high probability. If one wants a higher level of certainty, the algorithm is simply repeated with another choice of w. This method is easily generalised to an iterated cipher, and we get the following result, extending that of 5, Th. 11]. Theorem 1. Given an iterated block cipher, let d denote the polynomial degree of the ciphertext bits of the round next to the last as a function of the plaintext bits. Furthermore, let b denote the number of last-round key bits. Assume that the polynomial degree of the ciphertext bits increases with the number of rounds.
Then there exists a d-th order di erential attack of average time complexity 2 b+d requiring 2 d+1 chosen plaintexts which will successfully recover the last-round key.
Proof. We give the proof in the case of a Feistel cipher, from which the general case follows. Consider the iteration (3b). Let k denote the correct value of the last-round key, and let k 0 denote any wrong value. Theñ y R = y L F(k; y R ) y 0 R = y L F(k 0 ; y R ) =ỹ R F(k; y R ) F(k 0 ; y R ): The di erence betweenỹ R , obtained using the correct key, andỹ 0 R , obtained with a wrong key, is two applications of the function F. Since by assumption the polynomial degree increases with the number of rounds, one can expect that will be zero only for the correct value of the last-round key with a high probability. Running an algorithm similar to the one above takes 2 d+1 steps for each value of the last-round key. On the average, we have to test half of the keys before nding the correct one, from which the time complexity follows. The attack can be improved by a factor of two, if the constant of Equation (1) can be predicted. In that case the iterations (2) and (3b) of the above algorithm are performed only for all a 2 GF(2 d ). The key for which = c will be the correct key with a high probability. For most ciphers, depending on the F-function, there are possible extensions to the above attack. It may be possible to perform the attack for only a subset of the last-round key, and also it may be possible to search for (a subset of) the rst-round key.
In the following we apply the attack to the cipher KN. We choose plaintexts where the right halves are xed. Since the output bits from the round function are only quadratic in the input bits, the polynomials in the attack described above on the 6 round version have degree not higher than 8. Therefore the attack requires only 2 Table 1 . The attack on KN using higher order di erentials has been implemented, and it recovers the last round key as predicted. Note that these attacks are applicable to ciphers with any block size 2n, as long as the number of chosen plaintexts is less than 2 n . The bigger the block size the more rounds can be attacked. We now attack the scheme by Kiefer 3] by the use of higher order di erentials 3 . The cipher is probabilistic and uses the following encryption rule:
where F : GF(2 n ) ! GF(2 n ) is a one-way function, f k : GF(2 n ) ! GF(2 n ) is a function depending on the key k 2 GF(2 n ) in some complex way, r i 2 GF(2 n ) is a random value, and m i 2 GF(2 n ) is a message block. The function f k has the form f k = k g where k : GF(2 n ) ! GF(2 n ) is a bitwise linear transform depending on k and g : GF(2 n ) ! GF (2 n 
Since fa 1 ; : : :; a 4 g is a two-dimensional subspace of GF(2 n ), the elements in fr 1 ; : : :; r 4 g also constitute a two-dimensional subspace. Note also that the Hamming weight of the exponent in the de nition of g expressed as a binary number is only two, implying that the output bits are only quadratic in the input bits. By Equation (1), this implies that we can compute the value of . If repeated n times, we will have n corresponding pairs of and . This makes it possible to solve Equation (5) with respect to the unknown function k (it is a linear transform). After having found k , we can invert f k and thus obtain a value of r i . Using this, we compute F(k) and the system is broken.
It remains to compute the minimum number t of known plaintexts needed to obtain n times four pairs (a i ; b i ) with the required property; recall that the cipher is probabilistic and thus we have no control over the values of r i . By using a birthday paradox type argument it can be shown that t (n 2 n+2 ) 
The Interpolation Attack
In this section, we introduce a new attack on block ciphers. The attack is based on the following well-known formula.
Let R be a eld. Given 2n elements x 1 ; : : :; x n , y 1 ; : : :; y n 2 R, where the x i s
Then f(x) is the only polynomial over R of degree at most n ? 1 such that f(x i ) = y i for i = 1; : : :; n. Equation (6) is known as the Lagrange interpolation formula (see e.g. 2, page 185]).
In the interpolation attacks presented in this paper we construct polynomials using pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts. We will assume that the time needed to construct these polynomials is small compared to the time needed to do the encryptions of the plaintexts needed in the attack.
Global and instance deduction
Consider the cipher PURE with r rounds. We exploit the fact that the exclusiveor operation used in the cipher corresponds to addition over a nite eld with characteristic 2. Consequently, the cipher consists of simple algebraic operations only, and hence each of the two halves of the ciphertext y, e.g., the left hand part, known p/c-pairs, which yields an algorithm for a global deduction. Note that the number of coe cients will be lower than speci ed, since not all elements x i L x j R for 0 i 3 r and 0 j 3 r?1 will appear in the polynomial. We have the following more general theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider an iterated block cipher with block size m. Express the ciphertext as a polynomial of the plaintext and let n denote the number of coecients in the polynomial. If n 2 m , then there exists an interpolation attack of time complexity n requiring n known plaintexts encrypted with a secret key K, which nds an algorithm equivalent to encryption (or decryption) with K.
In a chosen plaintext variant of this attack it is possible for an attacker to establish polynomials with a reduced number of coe cients by xing some of the bits in the chosen plaintexts. In that case, the result is an instance deduction, since the obtained algorithm can only encrypt plaintexts for which a number of bits are xed to a certain value. As as example, PURE can be attacked in such a way using only 730 chosen p/c-pairs. Subsequently, the attacker has an algorithm, which encrypts 2 32 plaintexts without knowing the secret key.
Key-recovery
In this section we extend the method of the previous section to a key-recovery attack.
Consider rst a known plaintext attack. Instead of specifying the ciphertext as a function of the plaintext, we express the output from the reduced cipherỹ = 27 since the degree does not increase in the rst round and since ty R equals the left half of the output of the fourth round. Consequently, 28 pairs of corresponding values of x L andỹ are enough to determine it uniquely (using Lagrange interpolation).
We then test whetherỹ is actually output from the reduced cipher or not. This is done by verifying whether a 29-th p/c-pair agrees with the obtained polynomial. If it does, then we assume that we have found the correct key. Similar to the attack of Theorem 1 it may be possible to perform the attack for only a subset of the last-round key, and also it may be possible to search for (a subset of) the rst-round key, depending on the structure of the round function.
Meet-in-the-middle approach
The attacks described in this section are extensions of the attacks in the previous sections using a meet-in-the-middle technique. We describe only the extension of the key-recovery attack; the extension of the global and instance deductions follow easily.
Once more, we try guessing the correct last-round key and use this to (hopefully) obtainỹ, the output from the reduced cipher. In the following, only the veri cation ofỹ is described. Given an iterated cipher of r rounds, let z denote the output of round s, where s (r ? 1). The value of z is expressible via the plaintext x as a polynomial g(x) 2 GF(2 m ) x] where m is the block size. Similarly, z can be expressed as a polynomial h(ỹ) 2 GF(2 m ) ỹ] of the outputỹ of the reduced cipher. Let the degree of g(x) be d g , the degree of h(ỹ) be d h and let d gh = d g + d h . Thus, the following equation g(x) = h(ỹ) (7) has at most d gh + 2 unknowns. The equation is solvable up to a multiplication and an addition of both g and h with a constant. Therefore, to ensure that we obtain a non-trivial and unique solution, we set the coe cient corresponding to the highest exponent equal to 1 and the constant term equal to 0. After this, we solve the equation by using d gh known or chosen plaintexts. We then check whether yet another p/c-pair (x;ỹ) obeys g(x) = h(ỹ). If it does, then we assume that we have guessed the correct value of the last-round key. 
Setting the constant term of g to equal 0 (the coe cient corresponding to the highest exponent in h has already been found to equal 1), we proceed to solve the resulting system of equations by using 12 p/c-pairs from the reduced cipher. This gives us the polynomials g and h. We then check whether yet another p/cpair (x;ỹ) obeys g(x L ) = h(ỹ L ;ỹ R ). If it does, then we assume that we have guessed the correct key. . This means that the number of coe cients in Equation (8) Theorem4. Consider an iterated block cipher of block size m with r rounds.
Express the output from round s, s r?1, as a polynomial of the plaintext and let n 1 denote the number of coe cients in the polynomial. Also, express the output from round s as a polynomial of the output from round (r?1), and let n 2 denote the number of coe cients in the polynomial. Furthermore, set n = n 1 + n 2 and let b denote the number of last-round key bits. Then there exists an interpolation attack of average time complexity 2 b?1 (n ? 1) requiring (n ? 1) known (chosen) plaintexts which will successfully recover the last-round key.
In the following section we describe a variant of the interpolation attack.
Attacks on modi ed SHARK
The iterated cipher SHARK was described by Rijmen, Daemen, et al in 11]. The cipher has block size nm bits and each round has a non-linear layer and a di usion layer. The non-linear layer consists of n parallel m-bit S-boxes. The di usion layer consists of an nm-bit linear mapping constructed from the ReedSolomon code. There are two suggested ways to introduce the keys into the cipher. The rst is by a simple exclusive-or with the inputs to the S-boxes, the other uses a key-dependent a ne mapping. Also, an output transformation is applied after the last round of SHARK. The transformation consists of a key addition and an inverse di usion layer.
The design strategy of SHARK is to consider each component of the cipher separately. It is argued \The non-linear layer has uniform non-linear properties, such that when measuring the resistance of the cipher against cryptanalysis we don't have to take the details of the interaction between the non-linear and the di usion layer into account." 11]. Furthermore, \If, for example, the S-boxes are replaced by other S-boxes, with equivalent non-linearity properties, the resistance of the cipher remains constant" 11].
We will denote by SHARK(n; m; r) the version with block size nm bits using n parallel m-bit S-boxes in r rounds. In 11] an implementation SHARK(8; 8; r) (64 bit blocks) is given. The 8 S-boxes are identical and constructed from the permutation f : GF(2 m ) ! GF(2 m ) given by f(x) = x ?1 . The cipher is analysed with respect to linear and di erential attacks, and it is argued that 8 rounds of SHARK(8; 8; r) give a security level comparable to that of triple-DES, and from 11, Table 1 ] it follows that 4 rounds of this version give a security level comparable to that of DES.
In the following we will show that there are many instances of SHARK that can be broken signi cantly faster than expected.
First of all, the number of rounds of SHARK must be determined with respect to the non-linear order of the S-boxes. Assume that the outputs of the S-box have non-linear order d in the input bits. Since the S-boxes represent the only non-linear component in SHARK, the non-linear order of the ciphertexts after r rounds of encryption will be at most d r . To avoid attacks based on higher order di erentials it must be ensured that d r is high, preferably that d r nm. Thus, for a 64 bit block cipher, if d = 2, e.g. using the cubing function in a Galois eld, the number of rounds must be at least 6.
We consider in the following versions of SHARK where the keys are mixed with the texts by the exclusive-or operation. Once again, we make use of the fact, that exclusive-or is equivalent to addition over a nite eld of characteristic 2. We will show that there are instances of SHARK(n; m; r), for which the interpolation attacks are applicable. We consider 64-bit versions using as S-box f(x) = x ?1 in GF(2 m ). This is the S-box suggested in 11], but, as it is also said \To remove the xed points 0 ! 0 and 1 ! 1 an invertible transformation is applied to the output bits of the S-box." In what we are about to show, these xed points play no role, so according to the design strategy of SHARK, variants with f(x) as S-box without the invertible transformation should give equivalent security. We stress that the attacks we are about to present are not applicable to the speci c instance of SHARK presented in 11].
The interpolation attack described so far in this paper work well for ciphers of low algebraic degree. The inverse permutation in a Galois eld has a high algebraic degree, note that f(x) = x ?1 = x 2 m ?2 in GF(2 m ). However, as we will show, there are variants of the interpolation attack, which work for these functions. These attacks depend only on the number of S-boxes and of the number of rounds in the cipher.
Consider rst a version with n = 1. It follows by easy calculations that the ciphertext y after any number of rounds can be expressed as a fraction of polynomials of the plaintext x (or similarly, x can be expressed as a polynomial of y) as follows y = x a bx c
where a; b; c are key-dependent constants. These three constants can be found using the interpolation attack with only 4 known p/c-pairs 4 by considering and solving y (bx c) = (x a). The result is a global deduction, i.e. an algorithm that encrypts (decrypts) any plaintext (ciphertext).
Next consider a version with n = 2. Let x L and x R denote the left and right halves of the plaintext, respectively, and let y i;L and y i;R denote the left and right halves of the ciphertext after i rounds of encryption. In general we get , which also upper bounds the number of coe cients in p i;1 . In order to be able to solve Equation (10) one would need at most 2 (2 i?1 + 1) 2 plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts. Note that the same pairs can be used to solve a similar equation for y i;R . Consider versions of the cipher with n S-boxes. One nds by calculations similar as above that the number of known plaintexts needed to solve Equation (10) is 2 (n i?1 + 1) n : The number of coe cients in the polynomials used in our attacks increases with the number of di usion layers in the cipher. Note that because of the inverse di usion layer in the output transformation there are only r ? 1 di usion layers in an r-round version of SHARK. To sum up, the number of known plaintexts for the interpolation attack on an r-round version yielding a global deduction is 2 (n r?2 + 1) n : It follows that the attack is independent of the sizes of the S-boxes, and it depends only the number of S-boxes and the number of rounds.
The interpolation attack with the meet-in-the-middle technique can be applied also for these ciphers. We consider the interpolation attack with known plaintexts. One rst establishes q j;1 (y 1 ; : : :; y n ) q j;2 (y 1 ; : : :; y n ) = p i;1 (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) p i;2 (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) ;
i.e., expressions of the ciphertexts in one middle round, where i + j = r ? 1, using polynomials of both the plaintext and the ciphertext. Subsequently, one can solve the following systems of equations q j;1 (y 1 ; : : :; y n ) p i;2 (x 1 ; : : :(; x n ) = p i;1 (x 1 ; : : :x n ) q j;2 (y 1 ; : : :; y n ): (14) The number of known plaintexts required to solve (14) is 2 (n r1?1 + 1) n (n r2?1 + 1) n ;
where r 1 + r 2 = r ? 1 and r 1 ; r 2 1. The round keys for SHARK are typically quite big, so the general keyrecovery attack described earlier in this paper may be impractical. However, it is possible to perform the attack for only a subset of the rst-round and/or last-round keys. As an example, one can repeat the attack for all values of the rst s words of the rst-round key and express the ciphertext (of a middle round) as a polynomial p i;1 (S(x 1 k 1 ); : : :; S(x s k s ); x s+1 ; : : :x n ), where S( ) are the S-boxes and x i are the plaintext words. The values of the key words for which the interpolation succeeds are candidates for the secret key, and the attack is repeated su ciently many times until one value of the secret key is found.
In Table 2 we give the complexities of the interpolation attack on variants of SHARK using as S-box f(x) = x ?1 in GF(2 m ). It follows that using 8 Sboxes, the 64-bit variant with up to 5 rounds and the 128-bit variant with up to 8 rounds are (theoretically) vulnerable to our attacks. The number of required plaintexts of the key-recovery attack is a little less than indicated variants and the workload of the attack is a little higher. We will not go into further details here.
In a chosen plaintext attack the number of coe cients in the polynomials used in the attack can be reduced by xing some plaintext bits. As examples, there exist interpolation attacks on the variant with 8 S-boxes and 4 rounds using about 2 21 chosen plaintexts and on the variant with 8 S-boxes and 7 rounds using about 2 61 chosen plaintexts. In this attack we x four of the eight plaintext words, so for a 64-bit block cipher the interpolation will work only if the needed number of plaintexts is less than 2 32 and for a 128-bit block cipher less than 2 64 plaintexts. We have demonstrated that certain instantiations of SHARK are insecure. Our results also demonstrate a case where the use of bigger and fewer S-boxes does not result in more secure ciphers. Finally, we note that the designers of SHARK expressed their concern with the use of the inverse in a Galois eld as S-boxes: \This may create uneasy feelings, but we are not aware of any vulnerability caused by this property. For the time being we challenge cryptanalysts to demonstrate any vulnerability caused by this property. " 11] . Challenge taken!
